मूलमध्यमककारिका (आचार्य नागार्जुन - चन्द्रकीर्ति प्रणीत प्रसन्नपदा व्याख्या सहित)

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Mādhyamika Philosophy of Nāgārjuna
Let us now consider the Mādhyamikakārikā of Nāgārjuna.
It is a pity that the auto-commentary of Nāgārjuna called Akutobhayā
on his Kārikā and the commentaries of Buddhapālita and Bhāva-
viveka are lost in original. They are preserved in Tibetan trans-
lation. The Mādhyamika school was latterly divided into Svātan-
trika sub-school sponsored by Bhāvaviveka or Bhavya and the
Prāsaṅgika school of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. A fragment
of Bhāvaviveka's Tarkajvālā has been discovered and also edited
with an English annotation by Dr. V. V. Gokhale of Delhi Univer-
sity. From the portions published, it is not easy to deduce the
philosophical position of Bhāvaviveka. It appears from the article
of Professor Y. Kajiyama, published in the Research Publication
Vol. 1 of Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara that the difference between
the two Mādhyamika schools is more logical than metaphysical.
The critical problem concerning the Mādhyamika school is the
determination of the nature and content of Śūnyatā. Dr. Satkari
Mookerjee, the greatest living authority on Indian Philosophy has
made this pertinent observation: Candrakīrti, the commentator of
Nāgārjuna, whose original work in Sanskrit has come down to us,
does not seem to leave any loophole to foist a positivistic interpre-
tation upon the concept of Śūnyatā.¹
The issue in a nutshell is whether Śūnyatā means absolute
unqualified negation or affirmation of a positive reality. Dr. Suzuki,
Prof. Stcherbatsky, and Prof. T. R. V. Murti are of opinion that
Śūnyatā is not a pure voidity. The Yogācāra philosophers such as
Asaṅga and Vasubandhu on the contrary have criticized the doc-
trine of Absolute Negation and assert the reality of transcendental
consciousness bereft of subject-object polarization. They call it
non-dual consciousness (advaya-jñāna). It is extremely unsafe to
voice the hypothesis that Nāgārjuna was a Negativist or Positivist.
It is however clear that Śūnyatā is not regarded by Nāgārjuna
as of the nature of consciousness. It is definite that the latter
orthodox exponents of the Mādhyamika doctrine, viz. Candrakīrti
and Prajñākaramati—the commentator on the Bodhicaryāvatāra
(Chapter I) are vehemently opposed to the concept of pure con-
tentless consciousness.
1 Introduction to The Absolutist's Standpoint In Logic, P. 3.
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Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā was discovered and edited by
Professor De la Vallee Poussin. He thoroughly exploited the
Tibetan translation and for the first time presented a materially
correct text. The edition of the Mādhyamikakārikā with Candra-
kīrti's commentary by the late Saratchandra Shastri was full of
corruptions. The present text has been prepared by Dr. P. L.
Vaidya, the former Director of the Mithila Research Institute on
the basis of Poussin's edition.
Nāgārjuna's Kārikās have been elaborately explained by
Candrakīrti and his commentary is intelligible even to a person
possessing a modicum of knowledge of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is
obviously needless to point out that his exposition is to be under-
stood as that of the Prāsaṅgika school and its unequivocal mode
of expression seals the path for palming off a positivistic construc-
tion on the text.
The matters of historical interest have been touched upon
by Dr. P. L. Vaidya in his Introduction and it is in the same posi-
tion of uncertainty as the chronology of older writers. What is of
central importance to a student of Indian Philosophy is the logical
assessment of the philosophical position of Nāgārjuna. If Candra-
kīrti be a faithful exponent, it may be asserted more or less cate-
gorically that Śūnyatā is not a positive concept. Dr. Vaidya has
alluded to the similarity of Śūnyatā and Māyāvāda. I am not so
categorically sure as Dr. Vaidya seems to be that Śaṅkara's Māyā-
vāda is derived from Nāgārjuna's conception of Śūnyatā. Rival
philosophers have censured Saṅkara by the designation of crypto-
Buddhist. The relative positions of philosophers are to be deter-
mined with a detached mind free from all preconceptions. Śrīharṣa
and his commentator Ānandapūrṇa have raised the issue of lender
and borrower.¹ Saṅkarācārya has deduced his Māyāvāda from the
Vedic sources. It is quite presumable that he may have exploited
the arguments of the Buddhist. But Saṅkara's repugnance to the
Buddhist doctrine is conspicuous and unambiguous. He has criti-
cized the central doctrine of negativism in his commentary on the
Bhagavadgītā. Saṅkara's philosophy is not capable of being equated
with Māyāvāda or Śūnyavāda. He believes in one eternal mono-
lithic existence-cum-consciousness-cum-bliss which is the nature of
Brahman. The two systems are diametrically opposed. Nāgārjuna
does not believe in a positive reality which is not subject to birth,
1 Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, p. 125.