महाराणा सांगा: द हिन्दूपत (हरविलास सारदा - मेवाड़ साम्राज्य एवं खानवा महायुद्ध इतिहास)

Maharana Sāngā.
tide of success but was himself unhorsed,
though finally brought off by a desperate
charge of his followers. Bābur's troops were
then pursued for about two miles." ¹
To detach Hasan Khan Mewati from the
Maharana, Bābur had sent a predatory force
into Mewat with orders "to plunder the
country, to carry off the inhabitants into
captivity, and to leave nothing undone to
ruin the province. The ravages were
extended into many of the neighbouring
districts, but the results of this diversion
did not answer his expectations."
"The repeated successes of the Rajputs,
the unexpected valour and good conduct they
displayed, and their numbers, for they are
said to have amounted to an hundred and
twenty thousand horse, had begun to spread
a visible discouragement among the troops."²
Bābur again opened negotiations for peace,
and employed the time thus gained to
strengthen his position and give his men
time to recover their confidence. In order
¹ Erskine's History of India, Vol. I, p. 465.
² Erskine's History of India, Vol. I, p. 465-6.
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Maharana Sāngā.
to reassure the drooping spirits of his troops,
he threw up entrenchments, in which he
placed his artillery, connecting his guns by
chains, and in the more exposed parts,
chevaux de frise, united by leather ropes.
These operations were continued for 3 or 4
weeks, during which time the army remain-
ed blockaded in this encampment. About
this time he received a reinforcement of 500
volunteers from Kabul, who were accompanied
by a noted astrologer, Muhammad Sharif.
Even the astrologer instead of being of assis-
tance, “added to the depression and panic
which prevailed in the camp by declaring his
opinion that the planet Mars, being in the
west, whoever engaged, coming from the
opposite direction, would be defeated.” ¹
Feelings of extreme uneasiness and dis-
may crowded the mind of Bābur when he was
thus forcibly cooped up in his entrenched
camp, while the Rajputs were in possession
of the open country. His introspective
spirit was quickened, and reviewing his past
¹ Erskine's History of India, Vol. I, p. 466.
133

Maharana Sāṅgā.
life, he felt that he had grossly and openly
violated one of the chief principles of his
faith, being firmly addicted to drinking
wine. He now determined "to renounce
this besetting sin in order to merit superior
aid to extricate him from his peril." Bābur
says in his Memoirs : "On Monday, the 23rd
of Jamadi ul Awwal, I had mounted to
survey my posts, and in the course of my ride
was seriously struck with the reflection that
I had always resolved one time or another to
make an effectual repentance, and that some
traces of the hankering after a renunciation
of forbidden works had ever remained in my
heart : I said to myself :
' Oh my soul,
How long wilt thou continue to take pleasure in sin,
Repentence is not unpalatable—taste it.’
“Having withdrawn myself from such
temptation, I vowed never more to drink
wine. Having sent for the gold and silver
goblets and cups, with all the other utensils
used for drinking parties, I directed them to
be broken, and renounced the use of wine,
purifying my mind. The fragments of the
goblets and other utensils of gold and silver
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Maharana Sāngā
I directed to be divided amongst dervishes
and the poor." Bābur also vowed not to cut
the beard, but to allow it to grow like a true
Mussalman. Nearly 300 of his men, great
and small, made such vows of reformation.
“The dejection and alarm of Bābur’s
troops,” says Erskine, “had at this time
reached their extreme point. The contagion
had infected even his highest officers.” “The
destruction of the wine flasks,” says Tod,
“would appear only to have added to the
existing consternation.” In his despair, as a
last resort, Bābur determined to make an
appeal to the religious feelings of his follow-
ers, “so powerful with all Moslems.”
Bābur says in his Memoirs: “At this
time, as I have already observed, in conse-
quence of preceding events, a general
consternation and alarm prevailed among
the great and small. There was not a
single person who uttered a manly word,
nor an individual who delivered a courage-
ous opinion. The Vaziers whose duty it was
to give good counsel and the Amirs who
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Maharana Sāngā.
enjoyed the wealth of kingdoms, neither
spoke bravely nor was their counsel or
deportment such as became men of firmness."
"At length," continues Bābur, "observing
the universal discouragement of my troops
and their total want of spirit I came to a
resolution. Having called a general assembly
of my Amirs and officers, I addressed them :
‘Noblemen and soldiers! Every man that
cometh into this world is subject to dissolu-
tion. When we are passed away and gone
God survives, One and Unchangeable. Who-
ever sits down to the feast of life must,
before it is over, drink of the cup of death.
He who arrives at the inn of mortality, the
world, must one day, without fail, take his
departure from that mansion of sorrow.
How much better then is it to die with
honour than to live with infamy.
‘Give me but fame, and if I die I am contented,
‘If fame be mine, let death claim my body.’
‘The most High God has been propi-
tious to us. He has now placed us in such a
crisis that if we fall in the field we die the
death of martyrs; if we survive, we rise
victorious, the avengers of His sacred cause.
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Maharana Sāngā.
Let us, therefore, with one accord swear on
God’s holy word, that none of us will for a
moment think of turning his face from this
warfare; or shrink from the battle and
slaughter that ensue, till his soul is separat-
ed from his body.’ Master and servant,
small and great, all with emulation seizing
the blessed Qoran in their hands, swore in
the form that I had given.”
Though twenty thousand soldiers of
Bābur swore on the Qoran to win or die in
the battle but not to leave the field alive,
yet Bābur was not assured of success, and
conscious of the grave consequences of a
defeat at this juncture, he renewed¹ the
negotiations with the Maharana through
Silhiddi, the Chief of Raisen. He offered
to make Peela khal near Byana the boundary
of their respective dominions and give an
annual tribute to the Maharana on condition
of being left Delhi and its dependencies.”²
¹ The Tabqati Akbari says that at this Council the
grandees advised Bābur to retire to the Panjab.
² Tod’s Rajasthan, Vol. I., p. 305: “We can well
believe,” says he, “that in the position Bābur then was,
he would not scruple to promise anything”—p. 306.
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Maharana Sāngā.
The advisers of the Maharana, with whom
Silhidi was not at all popular, dissuaded
Sāngā from accepting these terms, and the
negotiations finally came to an end. Colonel
Tod says that though the arrangement was
negatived, treason had effected the salvation
of Bābur. Silhidi, seeing that though the
Maharana had been offered more than what
he had started from Chitor to fight for, the
overtures were rejected only because he was
the medium. He took it to heart and deter-
mined to stand in the way of victory.
This ill-advised inactivity of the Maha-
rana while Bābur was cooped up in his
encampment, though partly explained by
the protracted negotiations for peace made
by Bābur, was most deplorable. If he
supposed that Bābur was in the toils
and that every day’s delay brought with
it increased danger to him, he should
also have considered that delay is always
fatal to the cohesion of a heterogenous
mass like that by which he was surround-
ed, all parts of which owned neither
the same patriotic feelings by which he
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Maharana Sāngā.
was actuated, nor were bound by the same
common interest. For the success of the
operations of a leader of such a coalition,
swift action is a sine qua non! Delay
gives scope to the play of disruptive
forces which bring certain ruin on the
whole body. Such forces inhere in com-
posite masess and are only held in check
by concentrating the attention of all on
one definite aim, by means the most direct
and easily understood by all. The Maha-
rana was surrounded by a number of chiefs
whose interests never coincided, who came
from different provinces, who belonged to
different and often hostile communities who
even differed in faith, whose aims in life were
different and in several instances conflicting ;
whose only common tie was admiration for
and confidence in the heroic personality of
the Maharana. In such a situation, the
leader to achieve success, must possess energy
and courage more than caution and
patience; bold aggressiveness more than
humanity and forbearance. He must
keep the various elements of his army
fully employed, and their energies directed
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Mahārāṇa Sāngā.
to achieving as speedily as possible the
common aim. Halting action, faltering
attitude, waiting upon time to do the
work of the sword are fatal, and entail
certain defeat. If the Maharana had
possessed the restless energy of his elder
brother, the ever-memorable, the "winged"
Prithviraj, or if he did possess it, had shown
it in a speedy attack on the entrenched
camp of Bābur; or if, with Rana Hammir’s
energy, he had fallen on the dejected, panic-
stricken followers of the brave adventurer
from Samarkand, the Turk (Moghul) dy-
nasty would probably never have occupied
the throne of Delhi,¹ and the history of
India would have run a different course
from what it has done. The Maharana’s
delay in coming to an action gave time to
Bābur to instil some of his own courage
of despair, some of his own heroic ardour
into his dejected followers, as well as
¹ Mr. Elphinstone in his History of India, page 373,
says: "Bābur’s advanced guard was immediately attacked;
and though reinforced from the main body, was
defeated with heavy loss. If the Raja had pressed
on during the first panic, he would have obtained an
easy victory.
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Maharana Sāngā.
to give a start to the disruptive forces in
the Maharana's army and set treason to
work.
Losing finally all hope of a peaceful
settlement with the Maharana, Bābur
determined to make the most of his
resources and give battle. Taking advant-
age of the excitement and the exhilara-
tion produced by his appeal to the religion
of his followers, and their practical response
to it, and in order to keep up their newly-
acquired spirit, he broke up the camp
to which he had been confined for nearly
a month and marched in order of battle
to a position two miles in advance. And
he had no time to lose. The dangers
were thickening around him. “Insurrec-
tion and revolt had appeared on every
hand. The towns and forts, of which
he had gained possession with so much
labour, were fast slipping out of his hands.
Rābera and Chandwar on the Jumna,
Koel (Aligarh) in the Doab, and Sambhal
beyond the Ganges, but all of them near
Agra, had been retaken by the Afghans.
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Maharana Sāngā.
His troops had been obliged to abandon
Kanauj. Gwalior was blockaded by the
Rajputs of the vicinity. Alam Khan,
who was sent to relieve it, instead of
excuting his orders, had marched off to
his own country. Many Hindu chiefs
had deserted the cause of the emperor.
Indeed the previous conquests and present
success of Rana Sāngā, had inspired
all his countrymen with hopes that a
change of dynasty was about to take
place."¹
On the 12th of March, Bābur drew
forward his guns and a kind of defensive
cover that moved on wheels, and which
served as a breast work, supporting them
by his matchlocks and all his army. He
himself galloped along the line animating
his troops and officers and giving them
instructions. He threw up other trenches
further in advance, near the spot which
he fixed upon as favourable for a general
action, and when they were finished, advanced
¹ Erskine's History of India, Vol. I, p. 469.
142

Maharana Sāngā.
to occupy them, dragging forward his
guns. As soon as they reached the ground
the Rajputs were seen advancing. All were
ordered to their posts. Bābur mounted,
and drew up his troops, riding cheerfully
along the ranks and assuring them of
victory. He took the centre to himself,
assisted by Chin Timur Sultan. The
right wing he committed to Humayun,
who had under him Kasim Husain
Sultan, Hindu Beg, and Khusrau Kokil-
tash; the left he entrusted to his
son-in-law, Sayad Mehdi Khwaja, and
Muhammad Sultan Mirza, Abdul Aziz and
Muhammad Ali Jeng-jeng. He appointed
strong reserves to carry succour wherever
it was required, and on the right and left
placed two flanking columns composed of
Moghul troops to wheel round the flank
and rear of the Rajputs in the heat of
the battle on a signal given. This arrange-
ment he had learned in his wars with the
Uzbeks. His artillery, under Ustad Ali
Kuli, was placed in the centre, in front,
connected by chains and protected by
movable defences, behind which were
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Maharana Sāngā.
placed matchlock men, and in the rear
a body of chosen troops ready to repel
any attack from behind or to rush for-
ward and charge whenever possible.
The Maharana's army consisted of his own
and that of the great chieftains who acknow-
ledged his supremacy or followed his lead.
Raja Silhidi, the Rajput Chief of Bhilsa
and Raisen, commanded 35,000 horse; Rawal
Udai Singh of Dungarpur and Hasan
Khan Mewati, 12,000 each; Raja Medni
Rai of Chanderi, 10,000 horse; Narbad
Hada of Boondi, 7,000; Khinchi Shatru-
deva of Gagrone, 6,000; Bhar Mal of
Idar, Rao Viramdeva of Merta and Chauhan
Narsinghdeva, 4,000 each. Sultan Mahmud
Lodi, a son of Sikandar Lodi, commanded
10,000 adventurers; various other chiefs
had each from 4,000 to 7,000 men. Rai Mal
Rāthor, Commander-in-chief of Jodhpur, and
Kanwar Kalyan Mal, heir of Bikaner, com-
manded 3,000 each. Prithviraj of Amber,¹
Rawat Bagh Singh of Deolia (Pratapgarh),
¹ Many historical records do not mention his presence
at the battle.
144

Maharana Sāngā.

Chandra Bhan, Manik Chand Chauhan, Rai
Dalip and others commanded large divisions.

The battle began about half-past nine
in the morning by violent charges made
by the Rajputs on Bābur’s right and centre,
which began to give way. Bodies of the
reserve were pushed on to their assistance, and
Mustafa Rumi, who commanded one portion
of the artillery, opened fire on the masses of
Rajput cavalry rushing forward and falling
on the Turks like falcons on their prey.
This fire made large gaps amongst them;
still new bodies of Rajputs pushed on un-
dauntedly. The battle was equally desperate
on the left. Just as the Turks began to
show signs of wavering, the traitor Silhiddi,
who commanded the van (herole) of the
Maharana’s army, went over to Bābur with
his 35,000 cavalry. This did not make
much difference, but just at that time an
arrow discharged by some one struck with
such force on the forehead of the Maharana,
who was seated on an elephant, as to make
him lose consciousness. The chieftains around
him considered it advisable to send him out

145

Maharana Sāngā.
of the battlefield, and appoint a person as his
representative, to continue the battle. They
placed him in a palanquin and sent him with
an escort towards Mewat. They asked Rao
Ratan Singh, the chief of Salumbar, to take
the Maharana’s place and continue the battle.
Ratan Singh replied that his ancestor had
relinquished the throne of Mewar, which was
by right his, and that he would not now
accept it even temporarily. He added that
he deemed it his duty to serve with zeal
whosoever should occupy the royal elephant
as the Maharana’s representative, and so long
as a drop of blood was left in his body, never to
allow the enemy to pierce the army under him.
Then, Raj Rana Ajjaji, who held the first
rank among the nobles of Mewar, and who
had, like the great Chonda, out of chivalrous
regard for his father’s wishes, relinquished
his right to the throne of Halvad in Kathia-
war in S. 1520 (A.D. 1463), but was adorned
with all the ensigns of royalty (of Halvad),
was unanimously voted to take the place of
the Maharana. And Ajjaji, assuming all
the ensigns of the sovereign of Mewar, occu-
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Maharana Sanga.
pied the vacant seat¹ on the royal elephant.
A chattra (canopy) was held over him and
the chanwar was waved over his head. For
a little while the Rajputs continued fighting;
but the rumour soon spread like wildfire,
that the Maharana had been wounded and
removed from the field. The bond which had
tied the different sections of his forces
together was thus broken, and various sec-
tions of the Maharana's army, not finding
their leader present, left the field.² Rawal
Udai Singh of Dungarpur, Hasan Khan
Mewati, Raja Manik Chand and Chandra
Bhan the Chauhan chiefs of Mewar, Rawat
Ratan Singh Chondawat of Salumbar, Raj
Rana Ajja, Rao Ramdas Sonagarah, Gokal-
¹ A poet says:—
रघु सुराजन राण, सिरधारे गजसिर चढे।
काढे खल तुरकाण, ईस फत्ते किधीअजा॥
(Assuming on his head the ensigns of the family of
Raghu (the great ancestor of Rana, the chief of the Solar
dynasty of kings) ascends the elephant : cuts down the
wicked Turks, such was the triumph achieved by Ajja).
² A bardic song says that the Turks lost 50,000 men
in this battle, and that Ajja went to heaven with 9,000
brave Rajputs.
पड़ धर सहस पचास मेघ घण मार न मंडे।
नव सहस समट लेकर मडर सुरपुर दिसा सिधाबियो॥
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Maharana Sāngā.
das Parmar, whose descandants hold Bijolian
(Mewar), Rai Mal Rathor, heir-apparent
of Marwar; the brave Mertia leaders Ratan
Singh (the father of the celebrated Miranbai)
and Rai Mal, and others were killed after
performing deeds of valour.¹
The Rajputs lost the battle, not because
they were inferior to the enemy, but because
of one of those chances that have often
decided the fate of kingdoms in India,
irrespective of the intellectual and material
resources of the parties engaged.. It was
so with the powerful Raja Anandpal of the
Panjab who, in spite of his unquestioned
superiority over Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni,
lost the famous battle near Peshawar in 1008
A.D. owing to his elephant becoming unruly
and turning back in the midst of the battle.
It was so again in the case of Dara Shikoh,
who was chiefly supported by the Rajputs and
who lost the battle of Samugarh in A.D. 1658,
owing to his transferring his seat in the
¹ Tod says that Mahmud Lodi was killed in this
battle, but Mr. Erskine says that he fled to Gujarāt.
Mehta Nainsi's Chronicles give the date of the battle as
Katik Sud 5th, S. 1584.
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Maharana Sāngā.
midst of the battle from the elephant's howda
to the back of a horse, on the treacherous
advice of the traitor, Khalilullah Khan.
That accidents could have such decisive
influence on matters of such transcending
national importance was due chiefly to the
political consciousness of the people having
become dormant. Swadharma, the duty of
the individual to the State, to the nation, to
the country in its broadest aspects, had
come to mean devotion to the person of the
sovereign for the time being and nothing
more. This contraction of the meaning of
the term Swadharma, this restrictive appli-
cation of it accorded with the facts of life
in the country, where the rights of the
individuals comprising the nation became
merged, not in the right of the State as with
the military nations of the European conti-
nent, but into the will of the person occupy-
ing the throne for the time being. The
king being the sole arbiter of the des-
tinies of a nation, the only source of power,
his personality counted for all even in a battle.
He being the head—real and not a figure-
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Maharana Sāngā.
head only—he won or lost : the nation only
because of him. If the arrow had struck
Bābur's forehead instead of Sāngā's, the
result would have been the same—a complete
defeat of the Turks. In fact, in their case,
it would have meant annihilation, because of
their being foreign interlopers in the country.
The present European War instinctively
brings before the mind the great advance
the Western nations have achieved in politics
during the last four centuries. In Europe
every man, woman and child understands
his duty to the State, which, he knows, is
nothing more than his own individual
interest in the higher sense of the term.
He or she understands that he or she loses
or gains as his or her nation loses or gains,
that his or her interests are identical with
those of the nation or the State. This
spirit animating all, the resources of the
whole nation are fully organised and are
unhesitatingly employed to protect as well
as to promote the cause of the nation or even
of individuals, whenever occasion requires.
A war in modern times is therefore a war
150

Maharana Sāngā.
of one nation or a combination of nations
against another nation or two or more nations
combined. The entire intellectual, moral and
material resources of nations are mobilized and
used in the struggle. The result is that that
belligerent wins whose organisation is superior
and whose resources, taken as a whole, are
greater than those of the enemy. As a neces-
sary consequence, wars now are immeasurably
more devastating, and though both sides are
in the end exhausted, the vanquished is the
party clearly proved to be the weaker.
This also explains the vast difference that
we find between the nature and importance of
a battle in those days and a battle in the twen-
tieth century. The battle of Khānua, in which
the opposing armies numbered about three
lakhs, lasted a few hours, and what momentous
issues hung on the result of that battle! It
decided the fate of a country inhabited by a
fifth part of the human race. It threw back
for ever the advancing tide of the triumph-
ant Rajput race, and placed India, with a
civilization and culture as old as history and
as high as the highest in the world, under the
151